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ABSTRACT
The threat of deepfakes is well-documented in the existing literature. Deepfake
technology has emerged as a powerful tool with which vulnerable individuals could
easily become targets of novel forms of exploitation and sabotage. Additionally,
deepfakes’ unique capacity to distort people’s sense of reality exacerbates truth decay.
The growing influence of social media and our deep-rooted cognitive biases further
escalate the harms of deepfakes. Despite these apparent concerns, scholars have noted
that the regulation of deepfakes confronts a constitutional challenge in the American
context, stemming from Supreme Court cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan and
U.S. v. Alvarez. In both cases, the Court emphasized the importance of protecting false
speech on the grounds that it constitutes an integral part of the “marketplace of ideas.”
This paper aims to show how the broad range of harms posed by deepfakes in the digital
age calls for a departure from employing the Times and Alvarez approaches to assessing
the constitutionality of deepfakes.
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Introduction
The word “deepfake” is a portmanteau of “deep learning” and “fake” (Rouse,
2020). It refers to a type of artificial intelligence (AI) technology that incorporates a
machine learning technique called generative adversarial networks (GANs) (Rouse,
2020). GANs was first introduced in 2014 by Ian Goodfellow and other researchers at the
University of Montreal (Goodfellow et al, 2014). The idea is to use a pair of neural
networks – one of which is called the “generator,” and the other, the “discriminator” – to
synthesize artificial media or multimedia content that is indistinguishable from its
authentic counterpart (Brownlee, 2019). One of the most striking features of this
algorithmic architecture is its ability to use as little as one image of a person to create a
video clip of that person saying or doing things they never said or did in real life (Libby,
2019).
In recent years, deepfake technology has earned its reputation as a threat to our
already vulnerable information ecosystem (Schwartz, 2018). Until late 2017, the use of
this machine learning technique was mostly confined to the area of AI research
(Schwartz, 2018). It was only when a Reddit user who, under the moniker “Deepfakes,”
began posting digitally altered pornographic videos in which celebrities’ faces were
superimposed onto the bodies of women in pornographic movies, that this technology
became widely known in the public domain (Schwartz, 2018). By the time Reddit later
banned the posting and dissemination of deepfakes from its platform, the creator of the
videos had released “FakeApp,” an easy-to-use platform for making forged media
(Schwartz, 2018). With the help of FakeApp, deepfake technology became widely known
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and available to the public, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of individuals
who utilized this technology to generate and disseminate deepfakes online, mainly
through social media platforms (Schwartz, 2018). In September 2019, the AI firm
Deeptrace found approximately 15,000 deepfake videos online, 96% of which were
pornographic (Sample, 2020).
The goal of this paper is to provide an in-depth assessment of this disruptive
technology in order to construct a more robust framework for evaluating whether
deepfakes should be protected under the category of “false speech.” The paper proceeds
as follows: Part I discusses the ways in which deepfakes present an unprecedented threat
to individuals and to society. Part II explains how false speech has come to be viewed as
a form of speech that warrants a degree of protection and why deepfakes, due to the novel
threats they pose, should not fall under this particular category of speech. Part III
discusses the importance of distinguishing malicious deepfakes from satire and parody in
that the latter two are legally permissible and socially valuable types of speech, while
malicious deepfakes assume deliberate deception. Finally, Part IV summarizes some of
the legal and constitutional challenges that need to be overcome in order to bring about
constructive and lasting changes with regard to the looming threat of deepfakes.
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PART I: THE PROBLEM OF DEEPFAKES
Why are deepfakes dangerous?
In response to the extensive use of deepfake technology in the realm of
pornography and increasingly elsewhere, many scholars, especially in the areas of law
and policy, have voiced their concerns about the potential for deepfakes to become
powerful mechanisms to exploit and sabotage others, as well as to harm society by
disrupting democratic discourse on important policy questions (Libby, 2019). Moreover,
recent events, such as the Russian intervention in the 2016 presidential election,
combined with the growing risk of cyberwar escalation, have placed the issue of
evaluating the danger of deepfakes at the top of many organizations’ agendas, including
those of some of the largest social media networks, such as Twitter and Facebook
(Ghaffary, 2020; Romm, Harvwell, Stanley-Becker, 2020).
One of the most seminal works in this area of concern is a paper titled “Deep
Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security,” written by
Danielle Citron, a professor of law at Boston University, and her colleague Bobby
Chesney. In the paper, Citron and Chesney (2018) explore a number of ways in which
deepfakes could cause harm not only to individuals but also to society at large. With an
emphasis on the findings of Citron and Chesney (2018), the rest of Part I aims to (1)
summarize the general view among scholars on the danger of deepfake technology, (2)
discuss the role of social media and confirmation bias in enhancing the danger of
misinformation, especially during a time of crisis, and (3) introduce how the issue of free
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speech presents constitutional challenges against efforts to regulate the circulation of
deepfakes.
Citron and Chesney (2018) begin their discussion on the many harms of deepfake
technology by focusing on deepfakes’ capacity to serve as powerful mechanisms to
exploit and sabotage others. In particular, they warn of the possibility of deepfakes
escalating the severity of rape threats by giving off the impression that victims can be
sexually abused at whim (Citron and Chesney, 2018). Even more problematic, the targets
of various forms of nonconsensual pornography made possible by deepfakes tend to be
disproportionately female as well as disproportionately queer, rendering such types of
digital manipulation especially dangerous to some of the most vulnerable groups within
society (Franks and Waldman, 2019). The authors further argue that even if a deepfake
video involves no sexual violence, any kind of abuse illustrated can be exploited to
threaten, intimidate, and inflict psychological harm on the individual depicted or those
who care for that individual’s safety (Citron and Chesney, 2018). Citron and Chesney
(2018) also examine how deepfake technology can be used to tarnish a person’s
reputation by portraying the person in a negative light in the presence of his or her rivals.
For instance, a malicious agent could falsely implicate a person by creating fake evidence
using deepfake technology. The agent could then make the depicted person sustain
serious damage, whether it be reputational, financial, or psychological, by sharing the
deepfake with the person’s rivals (Citron and Chesney, 2018).
In addition to describing the extent to which deepfake technology can harm
individuals through exploitation and sabotage, Citron and Chesney (2018) discuss the
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distinct possibility of deepfakes causing considerable harm to society. To begin with,
they argue that the threat posed by deepfakes at a societal level involves systemic
dimensions, for the damage caused by deepfakes may undermine efforts to maintain the
wellbeing of democratic institutions. They point to the intervention of the Russian
government in the 2016 U.S. presidential election as compelling evidence of how foreign
actors can seriously destabilize democratic discourse by exploiting the capacity of
deepfakes to distort factual information and thus manipulate beliefs – on the grounds that
one of the key ingredients for sustainable democratic discourse is “a shared universe of
facts and truths” backed by empirical evidence (Citron and Chesney, 2018).
Yet, the level of harm deepfakes pose to society extends beyond merely
disrupting democratic discourse. When debates on questions of policy become infused
with deliberate falsehoods transmitted by malicious agents, voters’ ability to make
informed, rational decisions about candidates running for an office of any sort is
unequivocally damaged. On this point, Manzi (2019) suggests that voters’ susceptibility
to falsities disrupts their ability to choose candidates who represent their interests. In the
current legal atmosphere, whether such disruptions amount to a legitimate case of
electoral fraud or vote rigging would be difficult to demonstrate, and it would be even
more difficult to bring the actors involved to justice – as we saw in the case of the
Russian intervention. Another reason assigning commensurate responsibility in this
regard presents challenges is that the constitutionality of false speech in the context of the
First Amendment has long been regarded as a highly contextual matter by the courts – a
consideration that will be elaborated upon in Part II. Nonetheless, the notion that
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deepfakes, by disrupting people’s sense of reality, have the capacity to influence public
opinion and thus destabilize our democratic institutions seems highly plausible and
therefore warrants further scrutiny.
The role of social media and confirmation bias
When discussing the dangers associated with deepfakes, it is also important to
understand how the nature of today’s communication environment, combined with the
effects of cognitive bias on how people perceive information of unknown accuracy,
enhances the capacity of deep fakes to cause serious harm. With respect to today’s
communication environment, for instance, we are seeing a sharp decline in traditional
media such as newspapers, television, and radio in favor of social media as the main
source of news (Manzi, 2019). According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research
Center in 2019, 55% of U.S. adults get their news from social media either “often” or
“sometimes,” and 88% of Americans recognize that social media companies have some
control over the mix of news that people consume each day (Suciu, 2019). The reason
such a shift towards social media presents challenges with respect to the circulation of
deepfakes is that social media networks, unlike traditional news organizations, do not
operate under the principle of safeguarding democracy or enabling truth-seeking in the
ideas of the marketplace (Manzi, 2018). It has been argued that the attention-grabbing
algorithms underlying social media play a significant role in propelling malicious actors
to inject social media networks with misinformation to sow confusion, political discord,
prejudice, and chaos (Deibert, 2019). Fournier (2020), for example, writes that social
media has enabled foreign intelligence agencies and entities to “covertly inject

8

disinformation through the use of highly searched hashtags, keywords, and precise
timing.”
The power of social media in facilitating the spread of misinformation was
recently underscored by the novel COVID-19 outbreak. Alarmed by the amount of
harmful memes and misinformation related to the outbreak on social media platforms like
Twitter and Facebook, Michigan State University’s Communication Arts and Sciences
professors conducted a close analysis of the situation. They concluded that the outbreak
has caused an “Infodemic” and that social media in particular has created conditions ripe
for misinformation to prevail (Priebe, 2020). Professor Dustin Carnahan attributes this
phenomenon to some of social media’s most prominent features. He suggests that
because interactions on social media usually occur between people who have personal
connections or among those who admire or respect one another, people are less likely to
question the believability of what they see (Priebe, 2020). He further claims that the viral
and unfiltered nature of social media enables information to spread without extensive
scrutiny by credible sources.
One notable example of misinformation related to COVID-19 involves President
Trump’s passing comment during a press briefing about using ultraviolet light inside the
human body or a disinfectant by “injection” as a treatment for COVID-19 (Panetta,
2020). Because social media is often used to quickly pass along statements made by
public officials or well-known celebrities, even if doing so risks the dissemination of
misinformation to a sizable audience, President Trump’s rather “spontaneous” suggestion
was instantly shared through various social media platforms. Although President Trump
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phrased his suggestion as “it’d be interesting to check”1 rather than a clear
recommendation based on science and facts, the extraordinary rate at which social media
users were sharing this comment caused a large number of people to falsely believe that
the President was telling people to inject themselves with bleach or isopropyl alcohol
(Mahadevan, 2020). Although scientific experts and medical professionals were quick to
repudiate the efficacy of such courses of action, within hours of the President’s
suggestion, there were already reports indicating a spike in New Yorkers ingesting
household cleaners, demonstrating the power of information, let alone misinformation,
coming from public figures with considerable influence (Sanders & Sommerfeldt, 2020).
During emergency situations, people have a natural tendency to rely on
authoritative knowledge when forming judgments on how to protect themselves from
potential dangers (Petryna, 2002). When people’s susceptibility to become less prudent in
their judgment in the face of uncertainty is enmeshed with a disruptive technology that
enables individuals to become subjugated to a false sense of reality, the extent of the
harm deepfakes can pose grows exponentially. As an illustration, consider the
hypothetical scenario in which a malicious agent decides to employ deepfake technology
to create and disseminate fake videos of political leaders or well-known medical
professionals making dangerous suggestions with respect to COVID-19 – perhaps to
sabotage the reputations of those portrayed in the deepfakes or to sow distrust, confusion,
and panic among the public. Under this scenario, the unprecedented pace at which

1

Trump’s exact words during the April 23, 2020 coronavirus briefing: “I see the disinfectant,
where it knocks it out in one minute…And is there a way we can do something like that by injection inside
or almost a cleaning because you see it gets in the lungs and it does a tremendous number on the lungs, so
it’d be interesting to check that so that you’re going to have to use medical doctors with, but it sounds
interesting to me” (Mahadevan, 2020).
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misinformation disseminates, coupled with the possibility of such misinformation
resulting in life-threatening decisions, could introduce a magnitude of harm that would be
neither quantifiable nor controllable.
Given that, as of December 2019, there are approximately 3 billion active social
media users, which amounts to almost half of the entire world population, it is reasonable
to speculate that deepfakes’ unique capacity to blur the line between fact and fiction can
cause significant harm. This is particularly true in the domains of health and science
where conflicting claims and mixed messaging can expose people to a wide range of
risks, as evidenced by President Trump’s suggestion about injecting disinfectants as
treatment for COVID-19 rapidly turning into a recommendation, unbeknown to the
speaker himself, after a series of reposts and spins made possible by the viral and
unfiltered nature of social media. (Clement, 2020). Another factor that makes the
unchecked proliferation of deepfakes especially dangerous is people’s susceptibility to
information that align with their preexisting beliefs, a tendency known as “confirmation
bias” (Casad, 2019). The idea is that people have difficulty processing information in a
rational, unbiased manner once they have formed an opinion about an issue (Casad,
2019). In other words, when presented with information of unknown accuracy, an
individual will generally respond based on his or her preconceived notions rather than on
empirical evidence (Sunstein, 2019). Cass Sunstein, a professor at Harvard Law School,
argues that the effects of confirmation bias are especially dangerous when the
information presented is false in that “once a false rumor has thus been accepted, a
correction then becomes difficult to accept” (Sunstein, 2019). In the same vein, Erza
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Waldman (2018), a professor at New York Law School, contends that false information
can harden biases, which increases polarization. This has the effect of eroding trust in
traditional reporting and encouraging the selection of information that confirms one’s
biases. Considering how well deepfakes can distort reality by generating content with real
people saying and doing things they never said or did, the pervasive effects of
confirmation bias paint a grim picture of the scope of harm deepfakes could cause.
The issue of free speech
At first glance, the costs of allowing deepfakes to freely roam around social media
platforms may seem to justify some degree of regulation to prevent further harm. Upon
further examination, however, one becomes cognizant of the broader significance of
deepfakes as a form of “false speech” whose constitutionality is still being debated
among legal scholars. Part II seeks to explain how false speech has come to be
recognized as a form of speech that warrants a degree of protection under the First
Amendment. Relevant Supreme Court cases will be reviewed, followed by a discussion
on how deepfakes, due to their unprecedented capacity to undermine free debates and
manipulate views that are critical to maintaining the democratic value of elections,
ultimately call for a different, less conventional approach to understanding the
constitutional value of false speech, especially harmful false speech, in the digital age.
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PART II: DEEPFAKES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The free speech argument against the regulation of deepfakes
The most frequently used reasoning against the regulation of deepfakes is that
they, despite their inherent falsity, implicate freedom of expression (Hall, 2018). In fact,
despite broad consensus on the need to address deepfakes and their growing influence,
many scholars have been keen to point out the possibility of such efforts going too far.
For example, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Policy Director for New America’s Open
Technology Institute warned that we must “avoid establishing legal rules that will push
too far in the opposite direction, and engage in censorship of free expression online”
(Franklin, 2019). Similarly, David Greene, the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s civil
liberties director, said that California’s new political deepfake law, which makes it illegal
for individuals to post manipulated content that give a “false impression of a political
candidate’s actions or words” in the 60 days before an election, is “overbroad, vague, and
subjective” and fails to strike an appropriate balance between preventing harm and
protecting the value of free speech2 (Fischer, 2019). Tsukayama, McKinney, and
Williams (2019) also advised against rushing to regulate deepfakes, claiming that while it
is important for society to acknowledge the harmful uses of deepfakes and hold the
people who cause them liable for their behaviors, it needs to do so in a way that does not
censor lawful and socially valuable speech – a point of contention that will be further
examined in Part III.

2

In October 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed two deepfake bills into state law.
The first legislation makes it illegal to post manipulated videos and pictures that give a “false impression of
a political candidate’s actions or words” in the 60 days before an election. The second legislation allows
residents to sue anyone who uses deepfake technology to place them in pornographic material without their
consent (Fischer, 2019).
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The value of false speech under “the marketplace of ideas”
Even though the Supreme Court has yet to evaluate the constitutionality of
regulating deepfakes specifically, the Court has made several decisions involving the
issue of “false speech” – granted, with some inconsistencies (Chemerinsky, 2018). For
example, NYT v. Sullivan (1964) established that false political speech enjoys
constitutional protection insofar as its prohibition would chill truthful speech, rendering
the regulation of false speech particularly challenging. Delivering for the majority
opinion of the Court, Justice William Brennan wrote that the decision was predicated
upon “the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” (NYT v. Sullivan, 1964).
The Court explained that false statements, in this regard, are inevitable and thus must be
protected if freedoms of expression are to have the “breathing space” that they need to
survive (NYT v. Sullivan, 1964). Moreover, Justice Brennan wrote that defendants can
only be required to pay damages to a public official for libel if a plaintiff is able to show
that there was “actual malice,” – that is, knowledge that the claim was false or reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the statement (NYT v. Sullivan, 1964). The court, by
emphatically rejecting that falsity alone suffices as a basis to deny First Amendment
protection, especially when the speech in question is a political one, established a
powerful precedent with respect to how false political speech should be viewed in the
context of First Amendment law.
The Court’s reference to the significance of an “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open debate” embodies one of the most influential governing principles in First
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Amendment law: the “marketplace of ideas.” Conceived by John Stuart Mill and later
incorporated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States (1919), the marketplace of ideas is the belief that “the test of the truth or
acceptance of ideas depends on their competition with one another and not on the opinion
of a censor, whether one provided by the government or by some other authority”
(Hudson, 2017). In line with this reasoning, the court has come to view false speech as
providing a necessary condition under which true opinions can ascertain “the truth”
(Manzi, 2019). U.S. v. Alvarez (2012) is a more recent case in which the Court utilized
the marketplace of ideas metaphor to place false opinions under the category of protected
speech under the First Amendment. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the plurality
opinion, concluded that false statements can be regulated only to the extent that
defendants intend to cause “legally cognizable harm” and that a direct causal link exists
between the “restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented” (U.S. v. Alvarez, 2012).
The value of false opinions was highlighted once again in Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus (2014), in which the Court recognized the harms of an Ohio law that
criminalized making false statements about candidates during political campaigns.
Despite the Court’s repeated emphasis on the value of false speech in the context
of the marketplace of ideas, the Court has also argued that false statements “are not
protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements” (Brown v.
Hartlage, 1982). In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell (1988), the Court held that “false
statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they interfere with the
truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.” A similar view was articulated in the
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Court’s earlier Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) decision, in which it asserted that no
false statement has constitutional value in that “neither the intentional lie nor the careless
error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate
on public issues.” Chemerinsky (2018) explains that the apparent inconsistency in how
the court has dealt with cases related to false speech is inevitable, because any analysis
regarding false speech “must be contextual” and must reflect the “balancing of competing
interests.” The Court’s actual malice standard, which gives false political speech greater
protection in defamation cases, exemplifies how the Court has come to engage in a
contextual analysis of determining whether a speaker’s statement should be protected,
despite its falsity, under the First Amendment (New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964).
The limitations of conventional free speech discourse
When one examines the ways in which the Supreme Court has constructed and
redefined the American tradition of free speech, especially regarding censorship, it is
evident that deepfakes do not fall nicely into the categories of speech that the court has
deliberated over throughout history (Kalven, 1988). Because deepfake technology is a
relatively new invention of the 21st century and its true impact is yet to be revealed, it is
important to understand how deepfakes differ from other types of protected and
unprotected categories of speech. This evaluation will provide helpful reference points
from which we can assess the ability of deepfakes to enhance or undermine the
truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.
Responding to the assertion that deepfakes fall under the category of “false
speech,” mainly in the context of NYT v. Sullivan a nd U.S. v. Alvarez, and thus warrant
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constitutional protection as a valid form of false speech, the first two sections of Part II
have illustrated how false speech has come to be viewed as a form of speech that, for the
most part, deserves constitutional protection as long as it does not present imminent and
verifiable harm. Nonetheless, many technology, policy, and law experts have emphasized
the need to evaluate deepfake technology in a new light due to its ability to diffuse
rapidly through social media platforms (Citron and Chesney, 2018). In particular,
scholars have pointed out the outdatedness of placing deepfakes in the same category of
“false statements” described in previous court cases (Citron and Chesney, 2018;
Chemerinsky, 2018; Manzi, 2019). Citron and Chesney (2018) illustrate how deepfakes’
capacity to introduce unprecedented forms of exploitation, intimidation, and personal
sabotage, as well as their ability to distort democratic discourse and manipulate public
opinion, provide convincing reasons to consider whether the benefits of enabling
deepfakes to circulate unchecked online outweigh the broad range of harm they pose to
individuals and to society. Similar arguments have been made by researchers and
academics who are increasingly wary of deepfakes’ ability to produce multimedia content
that is deliberately deceptive yet hardly distinguishable from its authentic counterpart. A
Brookings Institution report suggests that, because deepfakes are so realistic, they can
exert a considerable amount of influence over our “understanding of truth” (Villasenor,
2019). The report explains that by exploiting our inclination to trust the credibility of
information we see with our own eyes, deepfakes can transform complete fiction into
apparent reality or vice versa, resulting in a world where “truth itself becomes elusive,
because we can no longer be sure of what is real and what is not” (Villasenor, 2019).

17

Referring to NYT v. Sullivan, Sunstein posits that the idea of democracy is a
“double-edged sword” (Sunstein, 2019). The hypothetical scenario he provides involves a
speaker intentionally lying about a politician and destroying her reputation in the process.
In Sunstein’s view, allowing this kind of harmful speech is not consistent with the idea
that speakers need “breathing space” to preserve an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”
system of free expression in which speakers and writers are not deterred by the prospect
of lawsuits (Sunstein, 2019). Sunstein argues that unintentional mistakes, which may
occur when one engages in open democratic debates, are fundamentally different from
purposeful attempts to distort known facts. This further illuminates how deepfakes, which
constitute a form of deliberate deception, would not be protected under NYT vs. Sullivan
and that simply encouraging “more speech” as suggested by the marketplace of ideas is
not the be-all and end-all when it comes to preserving a healthy democratic space for
individuals to freely share their views with others (Waldman, 2019).
Chemerinsky (2018) also suggests that when the speech is false, the assumption
that more speech is inherently better is less convincing; his reasoning can be summarized
as follows: (1) S
 peech is protected partly because of the belief that the marketplace of
ideas is the best way for truth to emerge. (2) The harmful effects of false speech infect the
marketplace, and there is no reason to believe people will be able to discern facts from
falsities. In accordance with his views, the advent of the internet and social media, which
has enabled relatively unrestrained, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds, has
lent further credence to the apparent limitations of the assumption that “more speech” is
inherently better.
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The documented harms of deepfakes and their unique capacity to disseminate
deliberately altered content to a sizable audience shed light on how deepfakes differ in
their purpose and magnitude from the kinds of false speech the Court has come to protect
through cases such as NYT v. Sullivan and U.S. v. Alvarez. At the most basic level,
deepfakes are the embodiment of highly advanced forms of deception made possible by
artificial intelligence technology in the digital age. Just by this fact alone, actual malice
would not be difficult to prove, as long as the disseminators of the deepfakes in question
are either the creators themselves or are fully aware that the material they are distributing
are deepfakes. The component of demonstrating “legally cognizable harm” and showing
that a causal link exists between the regulation of deepfakes and the prevention of injury ,
however, would be much more challenging, considering that the scope of harm deepfakes
pose is not limited to individuals but covers a wide variety of audiences. In fact, the
greater harm lies in deepfakes’ ability to threaten democratic discourse altogether.
Because the rise of social media, combined with the effects of confirmation bias, has
rendered

democratic

processes

especially

vulnerable

to

misinformation

and

disinformation, it is important to recognize that the conventional rationale for protecting
false speech may – rather than strengthening the marketplace of ideas – ironically
undermine the kinds of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open interactions the marketplace
of ideas serves to protect.
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PART III: MALICIOUS DEEPFAKES VS. SATIRE AND PARODY – WHAT’S THE
DIFFERENCE?
Although the harms of deepfakes are widely recognized and the notion that
deepfakes should be protected as a form of false speech exposes serious legal limitations
in addressing these harms, one needs to bear in mind that prohibiting the use of deepfakes
altogether may risk censoring lawful and socially valuable speech, such as parodies and
satires. Consider the following hypothetical scenario, which helps to shed light on the
rationale behind the need to distinguish malicious deepfakes from deepfakes that may be
used legally as a tool to satirize or parody certain aspects of society or the government
(HG.org).
Let us assume that an avid supporter of Joe Biden, the leading Democratic
candidate for the 2020 U.S. presidential election, decides to create a deepfake video of
President Trump admitting to accusations against him as a way to satirize the fact that the
President, despite much evidence in support of his involvement in numerous corruption
scandals, has consistently denied his role. If this video were to circulate around social
media under the guise of an authentic recording, that would amount to a legitimate case
of libel, which is punishable by law. However, if the creator of this deepfake decides to
clearly label the video as a deepfake in order to prevent its viewers from confusing the
fake content as the truth, his or her malicious intent is substantially nullified. At that
point, the question of liability for the deepfake and its potential negative consequences
becomes less obvious.
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Moreover, if we assume that the creator of the Trump deepfake leveraged the
unique capacities of deepfake technology, not to deliberately deceive its viewers, but to
simply increase the efficacy and reachability of his satirical message, limiting this kind of
use becomes even more concerning. Although malicious deepfakes are fundamentally
different from the kinds of false speech protected under NYT v. Sullivan and U.S. v.
Alvarez, if deepfake technology were to be incorporated as a tool to satirize or parody the
government, and the creator labels their work as a deepfake, the resulting deepfake would
reasonably be protected as a socially valuable speech in the context of First Amendment
law. The discrepancies that exist even within the category of deepfakes further illustrates
the highly contextual nature of determining the limits of free speech protections, as
suggested by Chereminsky (2018).
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PART IV: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As illustrated in Part III, indiscriminately prohibiting all forms of deepfakes may
compromise socially valuable speech, such as parodies and satires. However, in response
to growing concerns over the spread of misinformation ahead of the 2020 presidential
election, many social media companies are implementing new policies to detect and
remove content that has been deliberately altered and is likely to cause serious damage.
Notably, Twitter recently began applying a label to tweets containing synthetic or
deliberately altered forms of media (Paul, 2020). The company also said it would actively
remove any intentionally misleading manipulated content that is likely to cause harm
(e.g. content that could cause violence, voter suppression, or privacy violations) (Paul,
2020). Moreover, Alphabet Inc’s YouTube said it would remove any content that has
been technically manipulated or doctored and may pose a “serious risk of egregious
harm” (Paul, 2020). Similarly, Facebook announced its plan to ban certain manipulated
photos and videos from its platform. It is important to note, however, that Facebook
explicitly exempted content that is parody or satire from its new policy to combat the
spread of deepfakes, further illustrating the need to clearly distinguish the use of
deepfakes for the purpose of satire or parody from other malicious uses. For the most
part, the actions that many social media companies are taking to combat the growing
problem with deepfakes on the internet is promising as it brings awareness and, therefore,
prudence to those who continue to seek robust ways to manage malicious deepfakes
online.
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However, social media companies’ preventative policies are insufficient to
safeguard democratic institutions from the spread of misinformation and disinformation
in the digital age. In addition to the protections conferred by the First Amendment, the
3

“fair use” doctrine in copyright law, and section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (CDA)4 provide ample room for malicious actors to continue infecting online
communication networks with harmful deepfakes.
Some legal scholars have suggested that amending section 230 of CDA, which
shields social media companies from liability for unlawful user-generated content as long
as they take reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful content posted by their users,
would be a prudent way to comprehensively address the ways in which online content is
published and distributed. Although amending section 230 of CDA so that social media
companies are no longer immune from liability could certainly incentivize social media
companies to discourage users from spreading misinformation and disinformation, Manzi
(2018) suggests that this move alone would not eliminate the issue of fake news and
deepfakes online. Manzi (2018) points to the actual malice standard as proof, in that
while false speech that harms specific individuals would subject re-publishers to liability,
false speech that causes general harm is currently unactionable.

3

“Fair use” doctrine in copyright law is a legal doctrine that promotes freedom of expression by
permitting the unlicensed use of copyright-protected works in certain circumstances. Section 107 of the
Copyright Act provides the statutory framework for determining whether something is a fair use and
identifies certain types of uses – such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and
research – as examples of activities that may qualify as fair use (U.S. Copyright Office, 2020).
4

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which was passed in 1996, says an
“interactive computer service” can’t be treated as the publisher or speaker of third-party content. This
protects websites from lawsuits If a user posts something illegal, although there are exceptions for
copyright violations, sex work-related material, and violations of federal criminal law (Newton, 2020).
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Above all, the biggest obstacle to combating the spread of deepfakes seems to lie
in the strong constitutional framework around false speech, especially false political
speech, whose constitutional value within the marketplace of ideas framework is
explicated in NYT v. Sullivan. Considering deepfakes’ deliberately deceptive nature and
the unique harms they pose to democratic processes, it is reasonable to believe that
deepfakes should not be assessed using the same kind of rationale employed in NYT v.
Sullivan and U.S. v. Alvarez. Nonetheless, until there is a serious reconsideration or
perhaps a reversal of the Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of false speech,
statutes criminalizing malicious and false speech would not be able to withstand the
constitutional challenge rooted in the actual malice standard, as well as the Alavarez
requirements that the speech causes “legally cognizable harm” and a direct causal link
exists between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented” (NYT v. Sullivan;
U.S. v. Alvarez).
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CONCLUSION
Discussing the value of free speech in conjunction with the use of artificial
intelligence technology such as deepfake technology is a relatively new phenomenon. As
illustrated in the paper, there are numerous complexities and limitations involved in
striking a balance between protecting the valuable uses of deepfake technology and
regulating those that cause considerable harm not only to individuals but to society as a
whole. In particular, the outdatedness of using the rationales articulated in NYT v.
Sullivan and U.S. v. Alvarez regarding the value of false speech presents constitutional
challenges against efforts to curb the threat of malicious deepfakes.
As difficult as this task may seem, the stakes of constructing a more
comprehensive and robust legal framework are growing exponentially as technology
continues to progress and reshape our societies. That said, a reconsideration of NYT v.
Sullivan and U.S. v. Alvarez is necessary in order to distinguish deepfakes and other types
of digitally manipulated content from the kind of false speech referred to in these cases.
One way this can be done is by delineating the specific contexts in which deepfakes can
be effectively regulated. In particular, the paper recommends that future research focus
on how malicious deepfakes fundamentally differ from deepfakes that are used for
socially valuable purposes and possibly come up with ways to further differentiate the
myriad uses of deepfakes beyond the one presented in this research.
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